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Oil and gas off the Galmudug coast: a margin surveyed, not drilled
· Galmudug.com
The question usually arrives as 'the oil drilling off Galmudug'. It is worth correcting at the start: almost nothing has been drilled. Along the whole south-eastern Somali margin the published record counts two offshore wells, the later of them from 1982, and until this year not one in the deep water that faces this coast. What exists instead is seismic data, a licensing map, a maritime boundary settled in court, and a set of geological arguments — good ones in places — about what might be down there.
The rock, and why geologists keep coming back
The Somali sea margin was made by a break-up. Rifting began in the Early Jurassic; from the Middle Jurassic until the Aptian stage of the Early Cretaceous the sea floor spread as Madagascar moved away from Somalia, and then the spreading stopped. What it left is the shape geologists look for: stretched continental crust buried under kilometres of Jurassic, Cretaceous and Tertiary sediment, cut by faults that tilt blocks of older rock into traps.
On the shelf and onshore the basins have long carried names in the literature — Juba-Lamu in the south-west, Coriole around Mogadishu, and Obbia, also called Mudug, to the north-east along the Galmudug coast. The deep water was effectively blank until a survey shot in 2014 was interpreted. The geologists who worked on it proposed three previously undocumented provinces offshore south-east Somalia: the Jubba Deep, the Mogadishu Deep, and, running north-east towards Galmudug, the Mid Somalia High, whose cross-sections carry features named for this shore — the Hobyo Trough and the Obbia Ridges.
The Mid Somalia High is where the most specific idea sits. That study mapped an extensive platform of Middle to Late Jurassic carbonate reefs over an area of roughly 100 by 200 kilometres, under present-day overburden of 1,200 to 3,000 metres — shallower than the Amu Darya reef reservoirs of Central Asia the authors use as an analogue. The source rock is inferred rather than sampled: Early Jurassic half-grabens are expected to hold lacustrine or restricted marine shales, the comparison being outcrops in Madagascar with total organic carbon between 2.3 and 23.6 per cent. The same authors are explicit that well and stratigraphic control is limited and that most of the lithology is read off seismic lines. That is the honest position — a well-argued model, not a measured one.
The comparison with East Africa's proven plays cuts both ways. What worked further south — the Rovuma Basin in Mozambique, the offshore blocks of Tanzania — is gas, in Cretaceous and Tertiary clastic systems, and the gravity-driven thrust belts seen off southern Somalia have been read as a larger cousin of the same structures off Mozambique. The seismic contractor's own reading is that the Somali margin may be oil-prone along its whole length. That is an interpretation offered by a company selling data, and no drill bit has yet tested it.
A drilling record thinner than the conversation
Counting Somalia's wells is not straightforward, because studies count different areas. A 2026 review of the sector puts the national total at roughly 70 exploration wells since systematic work began in the 1950s, predominantly onshore, with offshore activity limited to about six. The 2018 study of the south-eastern margin counts 25 wells in the onshore coastal areas and exactly two offshore: Garad Mare-1, drilled in 1977, and Meregh-1, drilled in 1982, which is the only previous exploration well along that stretch of margin. Whichever count one takes, the conclusion is the same. For a coast this long, that is close to nothing.
The onshore wells did establish that a petroleum system works here, without finding anything worth producing. Near Mogadishu, Afgoi-1 was completed as a non-commercial gas discovery after a test flowed 7 million cubic feet of gas a day together with 120 barrels of condensate from Late Cretaceous and Palaeocene sandstones; Coriole-1 flowed gas at lower rates with a little 44-degree API oil. Further south, in 2007 Woodside drilled Pomboo-1 under a licence issued by Kenya, into a thrust anticline at the southern end of the Kismaayo Thrust Belt. It found Campanian sands of reservoir quality and no hydrocarbons at all.
The record changed in 2026. At the end of April the Turkish Petroleum drillship Çağrı Bey arrived about 370 kilometres off Mogadishu to drill a well named Curad-1 in roughly 3,500 metres of water, with a planned total depth of 7,500 metres and a programme put at 288 days. It is the first well Somalia's deep water has had. At the time of writing no result had been announced, and it is worth stating plainly what a single frontier well can do: it tests one structure. In a province nobody has drilled, a dry hole is the ordinary outcome, and a discovery would be the start of an appraisal programme rather than of production.
Collapse, force majeure and the years of measuring
Before 1991 the acreage was held by familiar names. Sinclair drilled most of the early coastal wells from the late 1950s; Gulf, Agip, Texaco, Conoco, Chevron, BP/Amoco, Shell and what is now ExxonMobil all held exploration concessions at one time or another, and across the whole period of hydrocarbon shows and surface seeps not one commercial discovery was made. Exploration stopped with the collapse of the state in 1991. The contracts did not simply vanish: companies declared force majeure, the legal device by which an operator suspends its obligations without surrendering its rights, and some of those positions were still live decades later. The 2014 deep-water survey was deliberately shot outside the shallow-water areas where Pecten, a Shell subsidiary, held legacy rights that remained in force majeure.
In October 2019 Somalia's state news agency reported, and the wires carried, that Shell and ExxonMobil had paid $1.7 million as preliminary rent covering a thirty-year term on offshore blocks; the two had held a joint venture over five offshore blocks before the early 1990s. That settled a rental question. It was not a return to drilling.
What did resume, steadily, was measurement. TGS-NOPEC acquired roughly 5,300 kilometres of offshore 2D seismic in 2009. In 2014 Soma Oil and Gas shot 20,550 line kilometres of long-offset 2D across the deep water on a basic grid of 10 by 20 kilometres, with a further 4,000 line kilometres infilled over areas of interest and an outboard limit at about 3,300 metres of water; Spectrum, now TGS, added more between 2014 and 2016. A 3D survey followed in late 2024 and early 2025, reported in one account at about 4,500 square kilometres and in another at about 15,000 — a discrepancy worth flagging rather than splitting. Thirty-five years of Somali petroleum history is, almost entirely, a history of measuring.
It is against that background that the circulating reserve figures should be read. Somalia has no proven oil or gas reserves, because a reserve is a volume proved by drilling and shown to be producible, and nothing offshore has been proved. A figure of 110 billion barrels is repeated often; when a careful outlet handled it in 2015 it said plainly that no one knows how much lies off the coast, and attributed the number to unnamed industry experts. Other numbers circulate too, some of them 'oil in place' from a licence-holder's own prospect inventory, which is not the same as oil that could be recovered. Where a figure cannot be traced to a named assessment with a published method, the correct thing to say is that the evidence is thin.
What the law says, and where the line runs
Somalia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1989 and proclaimed a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone on 30 June 2014. The zone covers about 830,389 square kilometres of the Indian Ocean, behind what is the longest coastline on mainland Africa. The Convention is what makes a licensing map possible at all: within its exclusive economic zone and on its continental shelf a coastal state holds sovereign rights over the natural resources, and those are the rights a production sharing agreement divides.
The domestic frame was built quickly, and recently. The Petroleum Law was ratified in February 2020; the Somali Petroleum Authority was established in July of that year; and the country's first offshore licensing round opened on 4 August 2020, offering seven blocks — 152, 153, 164, 165, 177, 178 and 204 — covering 30,168 square kilometres, six of them in the Coriole Basin and one in the Juba-Lamu Basin, with bids closing on 12 March 2021.
A licence also needs a boundary, and Somalia's southern one was decided in court. Somalia filed at the International Court of Justice on 28 August 2014, and judgment came on 12 October 2021. The Court held that there was no agreed boundary running along a parallel of latitude. It set the starting point where a line drawn from the final boundary beacon, PB 29, perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, meets the low-water line; from there a median line out to the 12-nautical-mile limit, and then a geodetic line at an azimuth of 114 degrees to 200 nautical miles and beyond. It also rejected Somalia's contention that Kenya's conduct in the disputed area had breached its international obligations. Kenya did not take part in the hearings held in March 2021. The judgment is recorded here as a fact of the record, not as a verdict on anyone's case.
What stands between a survey and a barrel
One obstacle is constitutional, and it is better described than argued. Article 44 of the 2012 Provisional Constitution says the country's natural resources are owned by the Somali people and held in trust by the state — without saying which level of government exercises operational control. Article 53 requires the federal government and the member states to consult on national policy, natural resources included, but supplies no binding mechanism. Article 54, which lists the exclusive federal powers — foreign affairs, national defence, citizenship and immigration, monetary policy — does not mention natural resource management. Article 122 requires equitable distribution of resource revenue and leaves the detail to later legislation. Into that gap went a political agreement reached at Baidoa in 2018, which set provisional revenue-sharing principles, and the 2020 Petroleum Law, which attempted to turn joint federal and member-state management into statute. Academic assessment of how far this has worked is cautious: implementation has been limited, and the framework has not been accepted by every member state. That is the structure; this piece does not take a view on any particular disagreement within it.
The other obstacles are physical and financial, and they are the ones any frontier deep-water province faces, only harder here — the cost of drilling in three and a half kilometres of water, thin technical and regulatory capacity, security, and the absence of a refinery, an export pipeline or a deep-water port anywhere along this coast. None of these is a permanent condition. All of them take years.
Which leads to the point most often skipped. Exploration is not production, and the distance between the two is measured in years even where everything goes right. Eni's Coral field in Mozambique's Rovuma Basin was discovered in 2012, sanctioned in 2017, and shipped its first cargo of liquefied natural gas on 13 November 2022 — a decade, in a country with ports, roads and an established regulator, for a floating plant of 3.4 million tonnes a year. Tanzania signed a framework agreement with Shell and Equinor in June 2022 for a $30 billion liquefaction plant over offshore discoveries of 20 and 16 trillion cubic feet, with a final investment decision then expected by 2025 and production in 2029 or 2030: close to two decades from discovery to first gas, on gas that had already been proved by drilling.
For Galmudug the honest account is short. The play nearest this coast, on the Mid Somalia High, lies far offshore in water kilometres deep. Were a well there ever to succeed, the field would most likely be produced from a floating facility and the cargoes shipped straight to market; it would not by itself rebuild the harbour at Hobyo or put many people to work ashore, and the first visible effects would be regulatory and fiscal rather than local. Hobyo, Harardhere and the anchorages between them have an economy now — livestock, fishing, coastal trade — and whatever does or does not lie under the seabed, that is the economy the next decade will be lived in.
Sources
The facts in this article are drawn from the following sources. Facts are free to report; the words here are our own.
- Davidson, Arthur, Smith & Tubb (2018), Geology and hydrocarbon potential of offshore SE Somalia, Petroleum Geoscience 24, 247–257 (PDF via the Somali Petroleum Authority)
- GEO ExPro, Licensing Update Somalia: A Final Frontier Opens Up (2020)
- Farid (2026), Federal Government and Member States Institutions Coordination in the Somalia Petroleum Sector Management, IJAREMS 15(1)
- International Court of Justice — Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya)
- Reuters via Oil & Gas 360 (25 October 2019) — Shell and Exxon pay $1.7 million for Somali offshore blocks
- Drilling Contractor (30 April 2026) — TPAO's Çağrı Bey arrives offshore Somalia for the Curad-1 well
- Abdulkadir Abiikar — The Petroleum Potential of the Somali Coastal Basin and its Offshore
- Voice of America (25 September 2015) — reporting on Somali offshore exploration
- Exclusive economic zone of Somalia — Wikipedia
- Eni (13 November 2022) — first LNG cargo departs Coral Sul FLNG, Rovuma Basin
- Coral gas field — Wikipedia
- Al Jazeera (11 June 2022) — Tanzania signs natural gas deal with Equinor and Shell