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Feature

Building a port at Hobyo: three agreements and a coastline

· Galmudug.com

A port at Hobyo is one of the oldest ideas on this coast and one of the newest. The town traded with the Indian Ocean for centuries without anything that a shipping line today would call a port, and since 2019 it has been the subject of three separate agreements to build one. The most recent, signed in 2024, is the furthest any of them has gone. This is what is on the record about it, and what is not.

Why Hobyo

Hobyo sits on the central Somali coast, several hundred kilometres north-east of Mogadishu, at the point where the Mudug plain meets the Indian Ocean. It is an old trading place rather than a new one. Accounts of the town's founding put it as a coastal outpost of the Ajuran period in the thirteenth century, and by the nineteenth it was the seat of a sultanate whose revenue came from the dhow traffic along this shore — the subject of a separate article on this site.

What it has never had is modern port infrastructure. Ships anchored offshore and cargo came in by lighter, which is a workable arrangement for sacks, hides and livestock and an impossible one for containers. The town itself is small: population estimates in general reference works put it at around twelve thousand people, in a district recorded at some sixty-seven thousand in a United Nations estimate from 2005. The climate is hot and arid, with an annual rainfall figure for the town of about 180 millimetres.

The argument for building here is distance rather than depth. Somalia's working ports are at Mogadishu, Bosaso and Kismayo, and the central regions sit between them, several hundred kilometres of road from either of the nearest two. Every imported sack of rice, sheet of corrugated iron and drum of fuel consumed in Galgaduud and southern Mudug has first been unloaded somewhere else and then trucked inland. A port at Hobyo would shorten that journey, and it is this — not the romance of the old sultanate harbour — that every proposal since 2019 has been built on.

Three agreements in five years

The first was Qatari. In August 2019, at a joint press conference in Mogadishu between Qatar's transport minister and Somalia's ports minister, the launch of a project to build a port at Hobyo was announced, following a set of development agreements between the two countries signed in December 2018. Nothing that followed on the ground has been documented in the way the announcement was.

The second was signed on 3 November 2020, between Galmudug's Ministry of Ports and Fisheries and a London-based grouping called Oriental Company — described at the time as a consortium of Turkish, British and Somali firms, represented in the signing by Crom Ltd, Hobyo Investment Ltd and Indian Ocean Holding Ltd, with a British maritime law firm advising on the state's legislation. The ministry said a survey team would arrive that same month to assess approaches to construction, and the minister said a second phase of construction would begin in March 2021. That timetable did not hold either.

The third is the current one. On 7 October 2024, at a ceremony in Mogadishu attended by Galmudug's leadership, federal parliamentarians and representatives of the state's two chambers, an agreement was signed between the Hobyo Investment Company — a Somali company trading as HICO, whose name had already appeared in the 2020 consortium — and Metag Holding, a Turkish contractor, to develop both a port and an adjoining free zone. It is this agreement that has produced visible activity.

What the 2024 agreement says, and what it does not

The terms that have been made public are these. Metag Holding is responsible for building the port and retains a thirty per cent stake, with shares in the project offered to investors; the first phase carries an initial budget of seventy million US dollars; and the construction period is given as three years. The arrangement has been reported as an eighty-year agreement, under which the contractor operates what it has built. At the time of signing, development work was expected to begin in December 2024.

The stated purpose is twofold: to take pressure off the existing ports at Mogadishu and Bosaso, and to open a route inland. Promoters of the project also present it as a future corridor for Ethiopian cargo, Ethiopia being landlocked and heavily dependent on Djibouti. That is a commercial hope rather than an agreed arrangement, and it depends on matters well outside the port's own construction.

What is not public is the rest of it — and the rest of it is most of it. None of the three agreements has been published in full. The documents that would answer the practical questions are not on the record: what tariffs will be charged, how revenue is divided between the company, the state and the federal government, what happens to the asset at the end of the term, and what obligations fall on either side if a phase stalls. For a project with an eighty-year horizon, that is a long time to be taking the terms on trust.

What has to be overcome

A port is not a quay. For vessels of any size to call at Hobyo, the approach and berths need sufficient depth, which on a coast like this one means dredging and maintaining a channel against the sediment the sea keeps returning. Behind the quay a working port needs cranes and cargo-handling equipment, warehousing, fuel and water, customs and inspection facilities, and a road good enough to carry loaded trucks several hundred kilometres inland. The 2024 agreement's seventy million dollars is a first-phase figure, and a first phase is a beginning.

The gap between that and a port capable of handling significant regional cargo is wide. One published analysis puts the cost of a fully functional facility of that kind at between one and two billion dollars, a figure offered as a preliminary estimate rather than a costing, but useful as an order of magnitude. It is the difference between a berth that serves central Somalia's own imports — which is a realistic and worthwhile objective — and a transhipment hub, which is a far larger undertaking. There are also costs on this coast that an investor elsewhere does not carry, security among them.

The current state of the works is harder to establish than it should be. Reporting from early 2026 described equipment and materials arriving at the site and quoted the company saying the schedule was being kept; that account has not been matched by independent verification that we could obtain, and there is little dated public reporting since. The project company's own website, meanwhile, still carries a progress indicator reading zero and a line saying construction will start soon, which says more about the upkeep of the website than about the site at Hobyo. Anyone following this project should treat its milestones as claims until a ship ties up.

What it would mean if it is built

For the region itself the case does not rest on Ethiopian cargo or on becoming a hub. It rests on the ordinary arithmetic of imports. Goods consumed in Dhuusamarreeb, Cadaado, Guriceel and Gaalkacyo currently carry the cost of being landed elsewhere and driven in, and that cost is in the price of everything. A working berth at Hobyo would cut it, and would give the coast's own exports — livestock above all, and fish from a shore that has never had cold storage worth the name — somewhere to leave from.

A port also changes the town it is built in, and not only for the better. Hobyo is a small place; a construction phase brings wages, and a working port brings traffic, jobs, land speculation, newcomers, and a local administration that must manage all of it. Towns elsewhere on this coast have absorbed that kind of change badly when it arrived faster than any plan for it. The free zone attached to the project makes those questions larger rather than smaller.

None of this is yet a port. What exists today is an agreement, a company, a reported budget for a first phase, and a coastline that has waited a long time. The sensible thing is to watch for the unglamorous markers rather than the announcements: a dredged channel, a quay with a crane on it, a surfaced road inland, a published tariff, and a vessel discharging cargo at Hobyo rather than at anchor off it.

Sources

The facts in this article are drawn from the following sources. Facts are free to report; the words here are our own.

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